# Systematization of the Discipline of Ethics and Unification Thought

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Bibliography

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## Introduction

This paper will attempt to systematize the discipline of ethics in the light of Unification Thought's theory of ethics.<sup>1</sup> To systematize the discipline of ethics from a viewpoint of Unification Thought means, in a sense, to make a textbook of ethics from a perspective of Unification Thought. When we undertake to systematize the entire discipline of ethics from a perspective of Unification Thought, we must be able to clarify the discipline of ethics by classifying its sub-fields and its various academic theories and by illuminating their views and relations with one another in the light of Unification Thought. Nonetheless, according to my view, if we want to attempt to systematize the entire academic discipline of ethics in the West from a perspective of Unification Thought, we will have to formulate a more comprehensive Unification Thought's theory of ethics. The theory of ethics as currently presented in the textbooks of Unification Thought' is not comprehensive enough to deal with relations among the various ethical theories and each theory's relations with Unification Thought. I have no doubt, however, that Unification Thought textbooks, the Divine Principle textbooks,<sup>3</sup> and Rev. Sun Myung Moon's speeches offer an excellent resource to guide, clarify, and systematize the discipline of ethics, but especially theological ethics, in spite of a minor shortcoming of the current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics for systematizing the entire discipline of ethics in the West.

Therefore, in the first section, we will attempt to re-systematize Unification Thought's theory of ethics by utilizing Unification Thought textbooks, the Divine Principle books, and Rev. Sun Myung Moon's speeches, so that it can deal with all sub-fields and theories of ethics. In other words, we will re-systematize it from a viewpoint of the central goodness and the "Three Great Blessings" defined in the Divine Principle book, so that we may regard sub-fields such as "environmental ethics," which is concerned with proper human relations with non-human things, as existing within the boundaries of what Unification Thought defines as the academic discipline of ethics .

Then, in the second section, we will classify the discipline of ethics by the nature of its contents, by its methodology to determine the good and the right, by its subject field, and by the type of its researchers. In the third section, because the most serious scholarly disagreement in the discipline of ethics is located in the realm of its methodology to determine the good and the right, this paper will focus on the evaluation of major ethical theories distinguished by their different methodologies. The major ethical theories to be appraised in this paper are teleological ethics, deontological ethics, consequential ethics, situation ethics, character (or virtue) ethics, and antinomian ethics. We will attempt to clarify their views, validity, and relations among themselves in the light of Unification Thought. In Conclusion, we will appraise the relevance of Unification Thought to the discipline of ethics. This paper will assert that Unification Thought can basically support and improve teleological ethics, deontological ethics, and character ethics, and that it will facilitate the decline of antinomian ethics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In this paper, "Unification Thought book's theory of ethics" means the theory of ethics presented in the current textbooks of Unification Thought, whereas a "Unification Thought's theory of ethics" means an expanded and revised theory of ethics based not only on the textbooks of Unification Thought but also on the textbooks of the Divine Principle and Rev. Sun Myung Moon's speeches.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See e.g., Unification Thought Institute [hereafter UTI], <u>Essentials of Unification Thought: The Head-Wing Thought</u> (Tokyo: UTI, 1992).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See e.g., Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity [hereafter HSA-UWC], <u>Exposition of the Divine</u> <u>Principle</u> (New York: HSA-UWC, 1996).

## I. Re-Systematizing Unification Thought's Theory of Ethics

In this first section, we will begin with summarizing the Far Eastern cultural characteristics of the theory of ethics presented in the textbooks of Unification Thought. Then, we will point out its shortcomings for systematization of the entire discipline of ethics in the West and present a new and more comprehensive way to re-systematize Unification Thought's theory of ethics on the basis of the Divine Principle book and Rev. Moon's speeches.

#### 1.Far Eastern Cultural Characteristics of Unification Thought Book's Theory of Ethics

It is important to be aware that Unification Thought book's theory of ethics was formulated in Korea under the influence of the Far Eastern culture. In other words, because both Rev. Sun Myung Moon, the founder of Unification Thought, and Dr. Sang Hun Lee, the editor of Unification Thought textbooks, were born and educated in the Far East, Unification Thought book's theory of ethics has some uniquely Far Eastern characteristics. I am not saying that such Far Eastern characteristics are wrong. In the context of the Far Eastern Asia, they can be very understandable and useful. Even in the Western societies, some of the East Asian characteristics of Unification Thought book's theory of ethics can contribute to correcting the Western cultural extremes (e.g., extreme individualism). Nonetheless, if we want to make Unification Thought's theory of ethics widely acceptable to other cultures and useful in systematizing the entire Western discipline of ethics, I believe that we should know such uniquely Far Eastern characteristics and attempt to make up for its shortcomings.

One of such Far Eastern cultural characteristics is its definition of morality and ethics. As Christian ethicist Burtness noted, in the Western societies, "the distinction [between morality and ethics] is not always, or even generally, observed in common speech."<sup>4</sup> In the textbook of Unification Thought, morality and ethics are, however, defined as follows:

In Unification Thought, morality is defined as the "norm of human behavior in individual life," and ethics is defined as the "norm of human behavior in family life." The role of morality is to guide the individual to the perfection of personality, and the role of ethics is to guide the individual to the perfection of family life. In other words, morality is the norm for the completion of the First Blessing, and ethics is the norm for the completion of the Second Blessing (Gen. 1:28).

Morality is thus the norm for the inner four-position base, and ethics as the norm for the outer four-position base.<sup>5</sup> More precisely, morality is the norm for a human being as an individual truth body, and ethics is the norm for a human being as a connected body.<sup>6</sup>

In my view, this definition of ethics is largely a result of the influence of the Far Eastern culture where the etymological and ideographic meaning of Chinese characters has influenced its people's way of discourses to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> James H. Burtness, <u>Consequences: Morality, Ethics, and the Future</u> (Minneapolis, MN: Augusburg Fortress Publishers, 1999), p. 48. For Burtness's distiction between morality and ethics, see ibid., pp. 48-53. In short, Burtness compares the relations between "morality" and "ethics" to the relations between "faith" and "theology"; therefore, for him, ethics means a study about morality.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Although the term "four position base" appears in the textbook of Unification Thought, <u>Exposition of the Divine Principle</u> translates the same Korean term as the "four position foundation."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 206.

considerable extent. The word "ethics" in Chinese character, "倫理," has an etymological or ideographic meaning of the "proper relations between and among human beings" or the "orderly human relationship." Therefore, when the people spoke of "ethics" in the Far Eastern societies of Korea, Japan, and China, the word had traditionally meant the proper relations between human beings for thousands of years, and the meaning of the Chinese characters "倫理" (ethics) did not include any consideration for the relationship between human beings and other non-human beings at all. Rev. Sun Myung Moon is not the exception when it comes to the meaning of "倫理" (ethics). In a speech, he spoke of "僮 理" (ethics) as follows:

We human beings are noble because we have ethics and morality. Human ethics (人倫) means the relationship between a person and a person. We do not use the word human ethics just for an individual person. The word human ethics is applicable only to the relations between two or more persons. The word of social ethics becomes reality only after a family is established by marriage of a man and a woman. Ethics (倫理) is the proper way and law of the relations between human beings.<sup>7</sup>

Another characteristic of the Far Eastern culture's influence on Unification Thought book's theory of ethics is its emphasis on the importance of family and on the family relations of the four-position foundation. A textbook of Unification Thought summarizes the foundation for the theory of ethics as follows:

To summarize, God's ideal of creation is for human beings to realize God's love through the family and to complete the family four-position base [i.e., foundation]. The aim of the Unification theory of ethics is to accomplish the perfection of the family four-position base. The Divine-Principled foundation for the Unification theory of ethics is as follows:

- 1. God is the subject of love, and at the same time, the subject of trueness, goodness, and beauty.
- 2. The original ideal family is the place where God's love is actualized divisionally through the family four-position base.
- 3. The persons in each position fulfill the "purpose for the whole" and the "purpose for the individual" through relating to three objects, that is, through fulfilling the triple-object purpose.<sup>8</sup>

I regard it noteworthy that current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics asserts that "God's ideal of creation is for human beings to realize God's love through the family and to complete the family four-position base" and that "The aim of the Unification theory of ethics" is also summarized as "to accomplish the perfection of the family four-position base."<sup>9</sup> In other words, current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics, at least in this section, is exclusively centered on the "Second Blessing" or the perfection of the family as the ultimate good.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Sun Myung Moon, <u>Reisetsu-to Gishiki</u> (Proper Manners and Rituals) (Tokyo: Kogensha, 1999), p. 64. Translation into English is mine. The emphasis is mine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 205. Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid. In my view, these summaries are not wrong, because Unification Thought book's theory of ethics assumes the discipline of ethics to be a study of proper relations between human beings, but they are somewhat incomplete when we analyze the entire discipline of ethics in the West, as I point out its shortcomings in the next section.

## 2. Towards a More Comprehensive Systematization of Unification Thought's Theory of Ethics

As presented in the previous section, Unification Thought book's theory of ethics contains clear characteristics of the influence of the Far Eastern culture. Nonetheless, if we want to systematize the entire discipline of ethics ever researched and discussed in the Western societies, we will be compelled to adjust and to expand the conceptualization of ethics in the textbook of Unification Thought. What I attempt to do is not to deny the validity and focal point of Unification Thought book's theory of ethics in the least, but to expand the scope and definition of ethics so that we can classify and discuss all the sub-fields of the Western discipline of ethics as legitimate subjects within the boundaries of the discipline of ethics from the viewpoint of Unification Thought.

First of all, the word "ethics" in the Western societies deal, not only with relations between a person and a person, but also with relations between a person and non-human beings as well. Consequently, the issue of the "environmental ethics" has become popular in the Western societies since the latter part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In contrast, if we stick to the narrow traditional Far Eastern cultural concept of the discipline of ethics such as presented in Unification Thought book's theory of ethics, there will remain no room to discuss the so-called "environmental ethics" as a legitimate topic within the boundaries of the academic discipline of ethics. The environmental ethics is concerned, not with proper relations between a person and a person, but with proper relations between a person and non-human beings. Therefore, I suggest that we re-systematize Unification Thought book's theory of ethics in a more comprehensive way on the basis of the Divine Principle book in order to systematize the entire Western discipline of ethics.

Largely because Unification Thought book's theory of ethics restricted the meaning of ethics within the realm of the relations between a person and a person, it ignored the issue of the relations between a person and non-human beings. In other words, Unification Thought book's theory of ethics ignored the issue of the environmental problems or how we should relate to and love all things (e.g., animals, plants, and minerals) surrounding us, because its definition of ethics would not allow us to discuss the human relationship with our non-human environment as a topic within the boundaries of the discipline of ethics. Because of its adoption of the narrow Far Eastern meaning of ethics, our relationship with non-human beings cannot become a legitimate topic within it.

Nonetheless, the Divine Principle book clearly describes that the fulfillment of not only the First Blessing (i.e., perfection of the individual) and the Second Blessing (i.e., perfection of the family), but also the Third Blessing (i.e., perfection of the human dominion over all things) as the central goodness to be realized in order to build the Heavenly Kingdom on earth and in heaven or in order to fulfill God's purpose of creation.<sup>10</sup> The Divine Principle book defines the good as follows:

An act or the result of an act is considered <u>good</u> when it fulfills God's purpose of creation. This takes place when a subject partner and object partner unites through the harmonious and spirited give and take of love and beauty, become the third object partner to God, and form the four position foundation...

For example, when an individual realizes God's first blessing and fulfills his true purpose, the actions to this end are good and the individual is good. These actions involve the free-flowing give and take of love and beauty between the mind and the body so that they unite in the way of God and form the individual four position foundation. When Adam and Eve achieve the second blessing by building a family that realizes God's purpose,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See e.g., HSA-UWC, <u>Exposition of the Divine Principle</u>, pp. 32-36 and 39.

their actions to this end are good and the family they form is good. These actions include joining as a couple in the way of God through the harmonious and passionate sharing of love and beauty, bearing and raising children, and thus establishing the family four position foundation. Moreover, when a perfect individual achieves the third blessing, the actions to this end are good and all things that he nurtures are good. By relating with the natural world as his second self and by becoming completely one with it, a union is formed which becomes the third object partner to God, thus constructing the four position foundation of dominion.<sup>11</sup>

Thus, the Divine Principle book presents not merely the fulfillment of the Second Blessing but the fulfillment of all the Three Great Blessings as the good and as God's purpose of creation. Therefore, I suggest that we expand the meaning of "ethics" and re-systematize Unification Thought book's theory of ethics from the viewpoint of the good and the Three Great Blessings instead of the First and Second Blessings, that is to say, from the viewpoint of the whole concept of the good in the Divine Principle book. This is all the more appropriate when we consider that Western scholars have traditionally interpreted the discipline of ethics as "the study of the right and the good." Unification Thought book's theory of ethics also states in its introduction that "[i]n order to practice goodness, which is one of the values of the ethical society to come, a theory of ethics is necessary"<sup>12</sup> and that "[i]t is ethics that provides the guidelines for the practice of love."<sup>13</sup> Thus, Unification Thought's theory of ethics should be concerned, not only with how to love other human beings (the completion of the Second Blessing), but also how to love all things (the completion of the Third Blessing). Put differently, we must abandon the narrow Far Eastern concept of the discipline of ethics and accept the broader Western concept of the discipline of ethics as "the study of the right and the good," if we attempt to systematize the Western discipline of ethics.

In this way, the new Unification Thought's theory of ethics can expand the meaning of ethics from a study of the proper relations exclusively between human beings to a study of the proper relations not only between human beings but also between a human being and non-human beings (all things). In other words, its field of ethics will be expanded into both the field of "ethics relating to other human beings" and the field of "ethics relating to all things." Yet, we can still maintain the Unificationist concept of ethics as concerned with the proper relations between human beings and other objects, which now include non-human beings. In this way, Unification Thought's theory of ethics will become a theory systematized from a viewpoint of all the Three Great Blessings and from God's entire purpose of creation. Thus, I suggest that we revise the section of the definition of ethics and morality in the textbook of Unification Thought quoted above as follows:

In Unification Thought, morality is defined as the "norm of human behavior in individual life"; ethics relating to human beings is defined as the "norm of human behavior in family life"; and ethics relating to all things is defined as the "norm of human behavior in a life of dominion over all things." The role of morality is to guide the individual to the perfection of personality; the role of ethics relating to human beings is to guide the individual to the perfection of family life; the role of ethics relating to all things is to guide the individual to the perfection of the perfection of the perfection of the perfection of the set of ethics relating to all things is to guide the individual to the perfection of the set of ethics relating to all things is to guide the individual to the perfection of the set of ethics relating to all things is to guide the individual to the perfection of the set of ethics. In other words, morality is the norm for the completion of the First Blessing;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> UTI, Essentials of Unification Thought, p. 203.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Ibid.

ethics relating to human beings is the norm for the completion of the Second Blessing; and ethics relating to all things is the norm for the completion of the Third Blessing (Gen. 1:28).

Morality is thus the norm for the inner individual four-position foundation; ethics relating to human beings is the norm for the outer family four-position foundation; and ethics relating to all things is the norm for the outer four-position foundation of dominion. More precisely, morality is the norm for a human being as an individual truth body, and ethics is the norm for a human being as a connected body in relation to other human beings and to all things.<sup>14</sup>

Likewise, because we already expanded the meaning of ethics as above, I suggest that we revise the statement about "God's ideal of creation" and "the aim of the Unification theory of ethics" quoted above as follows:

To summarize, God's ideal of creation is for each individual human being to internalize God's love and to complete the individual four-position foundation, for a man and a woman to realize God's love through the family and to complete the family four-position foundation, and then for human beings to practice God's love through the life of dominion over all things and to complete the four-position foundation of dominion. The aim of the Unification theory of ethics is to accomplish the perfection of the individual four-position foundation, of the family four-position foundation of dominion.<sup>15</sup>

In addition, if we want to systematize the existing entire discipline of ethics, we also need a more comprehensive theory of ethics that can help us make a judgment of good and evil on the past and present acts of the people and of ourselves. The current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics basically deals with the problem of how to act in the original world, that is, in the ideal world. For example, the current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics does not provide us with an answer whether or not or on what condition we should participate in a war. Although the current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics lists "honesty" as one of the individual virtues, it does not tell whether we can deceive enemy in a war or we should be absolute pacifists and be honest even in a war. Nonetheless, the Divine

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This is my revision of a section in UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 206. Dr. Sang Hun Lee, the late President of the Unification Thought Institute and the editor/systematizer of the textbooks of Unification Thought, gave me a permission to expand the definition of ethics from the viewpoint of the Three Great Blessings, so that Unification Thought's theory of ethics can discuss the "environmental ethics" and other ethical issues treated by the discipline of ethics in Western societies; my conversation with Dr. Lee took place in my office on campus soon after the Unification Thought Institute moved to Cheonan campus of Sun Moon University from Seoul in the fall semester of 1996.

On the basis of the Three Great Blessings, Unification Thought's theory of education presents the three forms of education: "education of heart" to complete the First Blessing, "education of norm" to complete the Second Blessing, and "education of dominion" to complete the Third Blessing. Therefore, if we relate the revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics with Unification Thought's theory of education, we can see that "morality" is concerned with the education of heart, that "ethics relating to human being" is concerned with the education of norm, and that "ethics relating to all things" is concerned with the education of dominion (intellectual education, technical education, physical education).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> This is my revision of a section in UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 205.

Principle book and the Rev. Moon's speeches have clear answers for these questions.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, after taking the Divine Principle book and Rev. Moon's speeches into consideration, we should clarify a revised and more comprehensive Unification Thought's theory of ethics that can help us make a judgment of good and evil, not only on our future acts in the ideal world, but also on the past and present acts of the people and of ourselves in the fallen or transitional world. Especially so, if we want to systematize the entire discipline of ethics that has discussed the right and the good of the past, present, and future acts of humans for over two thousand years.

These are main points of the difference between Unification Thought book's theory of ethics and the revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics; although the latter is not yet fully expressed, we can regard it as consisting of Unification Thought book, the Divine Principle book, and the Rev. Moon's speeches. The revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics does not reject any of the important assertions of the old one; it basically adds the "ethics relating to non-human beings" to the old one and expands the old Unification Thought book's theory of ethics into a comprehensive theory of ethics that is applicable not only to the future ideal world, but also to the past and present world. In the following sections of this paper, we will attempt to systematize the discipline of ethics in the light of the revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics.

## **II.** Classifying the Discipline of Ethics

Systematization of an academic discipline is closely related with its classification; there is no systematization of the academic discipline without its classification. Therefore, in this section, we will classify the discipline of ethics in the light of the revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics. I agree with Sahakian in his definition of the existing discipline of ethics in the West as "the study of the right and the good together with the logical analysis of ethical terms, theories, and beliefs."<sup>17</sup> We will classify it by the nature of its contents, by its methodology to determine the good and the right, by its subject field, and by the type of its researchers. As I already discussed and expanded the boundaries of the discipline of ethics from the viewpoint of Unification Thought in the previous section, there remains no serious disagreement in the issue of its classification between the established discipline of ethics and Unification Thought. Therefore, this section will briefly classify and enumerate the sub-fields of the discipline of ethics.

## 1. Classifying Ethics by the Nature of Its Contents: Metaethics and Normative Ethics

We can classify the discipline of ethics by the nature of its contents. The great majority of ethicists now agree in dividing the academic discipline of ethics into two realms by the nature of its contents: metaethics and normative ethics.<sup>18</sup> Although Unification Thought book's theory of ethics does not mention the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics, I have no doubt that it can also agree in this distinction.

(1) <u>Mataethics</u>. Metaethics means a logical and analytical study of both the meaning of ethical terms and the nature and legitimacy of ethical judgments. We can also say that metaethics is philosophical and analytical ethics. According to Sahakian, "the term metaethics was coined in 1949 by A. J. Ayer in an article, 'On the Analysis of Moral

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See e.g., HSA-UWC, <u>Exposition of the Divine Principle</u>, pp. 99-100 and 368.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> William S. Sahakian, Ethics: An Introduction to Theories and Problems (New York: Barnes & Noble Book, 1974), p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics, see e.g., Sahakian, <u>Ethics</u>, pp. 3-5; Roger N. Hancook, <u>Twentieth</u> <u>Century Ethics</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 3-10.

Judgments.<sup>119</sup> R. N. Hancock, however, mentioned not only A. J. Ayer's <u>Language</u>, <u>Truth</u>, and <u>Logic</u><sup>20</sup> but also C. L. Stevenson's <u>Ethics and Language</u><sup>21</sup> as the two most influential books to establish a distinction between normative ethics and metaethics.<sup>22</sup> In any way, metaethics focuses on the analysis and methodology of ethics. Unlike normative ethics, it never includes a prescriptive statement with regard to concrete human behaviors.

(2) <u>Normative ethics</u>. Normative ethics means ethics that contains a clear moral judgment of the good and the right, or "ought to," with regard to concrete human behaviors. Normative ethics sets forth moral norms as a guide for human behaviors. Therefore, normative ethics contains directly or indirectly a statement that you "ought to" do or refrain from doing such and such things. In other words, normative ethics clearly recommends certain human actions as good. Because it contains a clear moral judgment, we may consider normative ethics more "theological" than metaethics, which does not have any moral judgment with regard to human behaviors.

Thus, metaethics is purely philosophical, and we may call it "philosophical ethics" in a strict sense. The traditional philosophical ethics such as the medieval philosophical ethics, however, contained normative ethics as well. On the other hand, it is taken for granted that what is called "theological ethics" contains normative ethics. Current Unification Thought book's theory of ethics is in large part metaethics; it contains only a very small part of normative ethics. Nonetheless, I regard an expanded Unification Thought's theory of ethics as consisting of metaethics and normative ethics, because the Divine Principle book and Rev. Sun Myung Moon's speeches contain a great deal of normative ethics. It is my view that we should consider the revised Unification Thought's theory of ethics to consist of not only the textbook of Unification Thought but also the Divine Principle book and Rev. Moon's speeches.

## 2. Classifying Ethics by Its Methodology to Determine the Good and the Right

We can classify the academic discipline of ethics into a number of types of the ethical theories on the basis of their difference in methodology to determine the good and the right. In this section, we will merely enumerate these schools or types of the ethical theories, because we will appraise the validity of each of these ethical theories in the light of Unification Thought in the Section III. There are a number of ways to enumerate and classify types of ethical theories on the basis of their different methodologies to determine the good and the right.<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, there is not a wide disagreement in how to classify them. I suggest that we enumerate types of ethical theories as follows: 1) teleological ethics, 2) deontological ethics, 3) consequential ethics, 4) situation ethics, 5) character (or virtue) ethics, and 6) antinomian ethics. Although there exists a general or rough agreement how to classify ethical methodologies to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Sahakian, Ethics, p. 202. Also see ibid. p. 5; A. J. Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgments," Horizon 20 (1949).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> A. J. Ayer, <u>Language</u>, <u>Truth</u>, and <u>Logic</u> (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936). Ayer was a professor of philosophy at Oxford University and renowned for his support of logical positivism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See Hancook, <u>Twentieth Century Ethics</u>, p. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Norman L. Geisler, <u>Christian Ethics</u> (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1989), for example, classified the ethical theories into six types: 1) antinomianism, 2) situationism, 3) generalism, 4) unqualified absolutism, 5) conflicting absolutism, and 6) graded absolutism. Joseph Fletcher classified all ethical theories into three types: 1) legalism, 2) situationism, and 3) antinomianism; see Joseph Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u> (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), pp. 17-39. James H. Burtness in his recent work <u>Consequences</u> classified the discipline of ethics into four types: deontology, situationism, teleology, and character ethics, but also extensively discussed consequentialism apart from teleology. I basically combined these scholars' classifications in this paper.

determine the good and the right, there have been many heated scholarly arguments when it comes to the issue of their validity. That is why we will appraise the validity of these six major ethical theories distinguished by their different methodologies to determine the good and the right in the Section III as a central part of this paper.

## 3. Classifying Ethics by Its Subject Field

We can classify the academic ethics by its subject field. There are a gradually increasing number of subjects in the academic ethics. For a long time, the discipline of ethics was a part of philosophy and often called "moral philosophy"; it was assumed to be "philosophical ethics" as a matter of course. In the twentieth century, however, the field of Christian theology became clearly separated from the field of philosophy, and the field of "theological ethics," which was also called "Christian ethics," has also appeared.

In addition to philosophical ethics and theological ethics (Christian ethics), the term of "social ethics" became popular in the mid-twentieth century as their sub-field. All the moral issues and problems of society were often treated and discussed under the category of social ethics. Social ethics has, however, further developed into a number of its sub-fields. We can enumerate the important sub-fields of social ethics as follows: business ethics, medical ethics, sexual ethics, racial ethics, environmental ethics, legal ethics, and bioethics. These were sometime called "professional ethics" and belong to social ethics in a larger sense. We can develop professional ethics into a large number of its sub-fields because it is possible to subdivide professional ethics on the basis of each professional occupation and its sub-field. Professional ethics is often concerned with professional code of conduct of professional occupational groups. Each field of ethics has usually produced various ethical studies undertaken by a number of different methodologies mentioned in the previous subsection.

#### 4. Classifying Ethics by the Type of Its Researchers

We can also classify the discipline of ethics by the types of its researchers. Sometimes, the types of its researchers and subject fields are closely related, but other times, these two are separate. Thus, Christian scholars' study of ethics constitutes Christian ethics. We can further subdivide Christian ethics into various denominational ethics such as Lutheran ethics, Methodist ethics, Baptist ethics, Roman Catholic ethics, Greek Orthodox ethics, and so on. Likewise, Jewish scholars' study of ethics is called Jewish ethics; Buddhist scholars' study of ethics is called Buddhist ethics; Confucian scholars' study of ethics is called Confucian ethics; Moslem scholars' study of ethics is called Islamic ethics; Hindu scholars' study of ethics is called Hindu ethics, and so forth. These are also viewed as part of religious ethics. We can subdivide religious ethics into as many religious traditions as they have existed on earth.

In addition to religious ethics, there are a number of distinctive ethics that are identified by the type of its researchers. When Marxist scholars study ethics, their work is called Marxist ethics. When existentialist scholars study ethics, their work is called existentialist ethics. When pragmatist scholars study ethics, their work is called pragmatist ethics. When feminist scholars study ethics, their work is called liberation ethics. When the so-called post-modernist scholars study ethics, their work is called narrative ethics. These ethics are called such regardless of the object of their research, because their perspective and methodology of the analysis are viewed as unique and distinctive. Each of these unique sub-disciplines of ethics usually belongs to one of

the types of the ethical theories classified by its methodology to determine the good and the right.<sup>24</sup>

## **III.** An Appraisal of Ethical Theories from a Perspective of Unification Thought

In this section, we will appraise the validity of ethical theories from a perspective of Unification Thought. The ethical theories we will discuss in this section are 1) teleological ethics, 2) deontological ethics, 3) consequential ethics, 4) situation ethics, 5) character (or virtue) ethics, and 6) antinomian ethics. These theories are distinguished by their different methodologies to determine the good and the right. The most essential disagreement in the discipline of ethics consists in the methodology to determine the good and the right, and the difference in this methodology has given rise to major ethical theories to systematize. That is why this Section III occupies the most space in this paper. I believe that these six ethical theories cover the entire discipline of ethics, although some of these theories are overlapping with each other to a certain or great extent.<sup>25</sup> In order to make the discussion of each ethical theory readable and understandable, we will use the case of "an act of telling a lie" as a concrete example.

#### 1. Teleological Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

Teleological ethics is an ethical theory that says the ultimate purpose or goal is the most important to consider when making a moral judgment. The term teleological ethics originated from a Greek word "telos" that means "the goal." Teleological ethics asks a question: "What is the ultimate good?" "What is the ultimate purpose?" "What is our ultimate goal?" In teleological ethics, if one's action can contribute to attaining one's ultimate good or goal, such an action will be judged as good.<sup>26</sup>

Aristotle's ethics is usually classified as a typical example of teleological ethics, because it posited the existence of the ultimate good at which all things point. According to Aristotle, everything has a proper goal toward which it is directed, and the goal toward which the human being is directed is happiness (<u>eudaimonia</u>). For Aristotle, happiness (<u>eudaimonia</u>) consists in an activity of soul in accordance with virtue, and a human life is a process of actualizing this potential. Therefore, he asserted that it is good to attain this happiness and that we should strive to attain this ultimate good.<sup>27</sup> Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism is also regarded as an example of teleological ethics.<sup>28</sup> Ethics of Marxism-Leninism is also an example of teleological ethics; it regarded any action that contributes to ushering in a socialist/communist society as good and justified. According to teleological ethics, if we take up the case of telling a lie, the act of telling a lie itself is not essentially evil. If the act of telling a lie contributes to attaining the ultimate goal, such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See the section II, 2, and section III of this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Teleological ethics and consequential ethics are overlapping with each other to a great extent. Therefore, the majority of ethicists do not make separate sections to explain the two.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> W. K. Frankena classified teleological ethics into two types: "ethical egoism" and "ethical universalism, or what is usually called utilitarianism." See William K. Frankena, <u>Ethics</u> (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973), pp. 15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> See Aristotle, <u>The Nicomachean Ethics</u>, translated with an introduction by David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Martin Ostwald, An Introduction to <u>The Nicomachean Ethics</u>, by Aristotle, translated by Martin Ostwald (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp. xi-xxvi. Aristotle's ethics is also concerned with character (virtue) ethics. See my discussion on character ethics below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Bentham's utilitarianism is also classified as a good example of consequential ethics. See my discussion of consequential ethics below.

an act will be judged as good in teleological ethics.

We can regard Unification Thought's theory of ethics as a type of the teleological ethics, because, according to the Divine Principle's definition, the good is decided on the basis of God's purpose of creation as discussed in the Section I above.<sup>29</sup> Unification Thought book's theory of ethics also repeatedly points out the importance of purpose when making a moral judgment; it says, "humans have the clear purpose of realizing God's love through the family four-position base; thus a behavior in agreement with this purpose is good";<sup>30</sup> it also says, "an act in accord with the purpose of creation is good."<sup>31</sup>

The Divine Principle book also presents a clearly teleological theory of ethics in interpreting good and evil in the past history. The Divine Principle book states in the section of "Good and Evil Seen from the Viewpoint of Purpose" as follows:

Any standard of goodness set during the course of the providence of restoration is not absolute but relative. In any particular period of history, obedient compliance with the doctrines expounded by the prevailing authorities is considered good, while actions in opposition to them are considered evil. But the change of an era ushers in new authorities and doctrines, with new goals and new standards of good and evil. For the adherents of any religious tradition or school of thought, complying with the precepts of its doctrine or philosophy is good, while opposing them is evil. But whenever a doctrine or philosophy undergoes a change, its standards of good and evil will also change according to its new goals. Similarly, if an adherent converts to a different religion or school of thought, then naturally his goals and standards of good and evil will change accordingly.

Conflicts and revolutions constantly plague human society, mainly because of the continual changes in standards of good and evil as people seek to fulfill divergent purposes.<sup>32</sup>

The problem of the teleological ethics is that there has been no agreement in the ultimate goal or good among scholars in the past history. In other words, there have been a large number of teleological ethics with wrong goals as the ultimate good. Marxist ethics is one of the examples of the teleological ethics with a misleading goal. Nonetheless, Unification Thought basically assumes the validity of the teleological methodology in deciding good and evil. According to Unification Thought, the ultimate goal and good is presented as the fulfillment of God's purpose of creation. It predicts that when all the people understand God's purpose of creation and attempt to fulfill it, the standard of good and evil throughout the world will become one and unified.<sup>33</sup> As discussed in the Section I above, Unification Thought presents the fulfillment of the Three Great Blessings and the realization of the Heavenly Kingdom on earth and in heaven as God's purpose of creation.

## 2. Deontological Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For the Divine Principle book's definition of the good, see HSA-UWC, <u>Exposition of the Divine Principle</u>, p. 39. See the section I above for the quotation of this passage in the Divine Principle book.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> UTI, Essentials of Unification Thought, p. 218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> HSA-UWC, Exposition of the Divine Principle, pp. 70-71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See e.g., ibid., p. 71.

Deontological ethics is an ethical theory that says obeying one's duty or universal moral obligations is the most important to consider when making a moral judgment. Deontological ethics asks a question: "What is right?" "What is our duty?" "What is our universal moral obligation?" "What are the rules to obey?" Deontological ethics asserts the existence of duty or universal moral obligations that all human beings must obey regardless of time, place, and occasion. Deontological ethics denies the idea that the rightness of an action depends on its purpose or consequences. Therefore, it takes neither the goal of an action nor the consequences of an action into consideration when judging the rightness of an action. In deontological ethics, if one acts to obey one's duty or universal moral obligation, such an act will be judged as right and good. Deontological ethics discerns the existence of duty common to all human beings throughout history, that is, the existence of universal moral obligations. If deontological ethics regards honesty (not telling a lie) as such duty or one of the universal moral obligations, it asserts that one must not tell a lie in any circumstance regardless of its purpose or consequences because it is right to be honest. Thus, deontological ethics is an antithesis of teleological ethics; deontological ethics rejects what teleological ethics affirms, and vice versa.

Scholars often point out Kant's theory of ethics as a good example of deontological ethics. According to Kant, "an act that is directly impelled by the categorical imperative to do a certain thing, irrespective of the results of that act, is good."<sup>34</sup> Without taking into account the consequences of an act, Kant was only concerned with the motivation of an act. We can also regard Thomas Aquinas's ethics as deontological because he emphasized the existence of the natural law we must obey in all circumstances to do the right thing.<sup>35</sup> The ethical views that emphasize the existence of the natural laws and universal moral rules transcending the time and space belong to deontological ethics.

Among Christians, there are a small number of groups that practice absolute pacifism. Some of these pacifist groups are the Amish and the Hutterites, who have their roots in the Radical Reformation in Europe. These absolute pacifists also support and strictly practice deontological ethics. They regard loving one's enemy and obeying God's command not to kill a person as their absolute Christian duty. Therefore, they never take up arms nor participate in a war as a soldier. Because they are opposed to kill not only enemy soldiers but also any violent criminals, they can become neither solders nor police officers who must carry a gun. As for the case of telling a lie, these Amish and Hutterites are absolutely opposed to telling a lie in any circumstance, even in a war. They are willing to suffer if their obeying Christian duty results in their suffering. They are often criticized that they live as if the Heavenly Kingdom were already established here on earth and that they do not understand the reality. It seems to me that many Christian evangelical ethicists, even if they are not absolute pacifists, assert that Christian ethics rejects teleological ethics and support deontological ethics.<sup>36</sup>

As presented before, Unification Thought's theory of ethics generally supports teleological or consequential ethics. In criticizing Kant's deontological ethics, Unification Thought textbook states that "In deciding whether or not a certain act is good, one must ascertain the result of that act."<sup>37</sup> Unification Thought's theory of ethics is also critical of Kant's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 213.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> For the scholastic concept of the natural law, see Jean Porter, <u>Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics</u> (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1999). Virtue ethicists have objected, however, to the deontological classification of Aquinas's ethics and attempted to classify him as an ethicist of virtue in recent years. See the section on Character Ethics below.
<sup>36</sup> Evangelical ethicist Geisler, for example, asserted that "Christian ethics is deontological." See Geisler, <u>Christian Ethics</u>, pp. 24-25.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> UTI, Essentials of Unification Thought, p. 213.

disparage of one's pursuit of purpose or goal. Unification Thought book's theory of ethics states as follows:

The problem in Kant's view was that he did not know about God's purpose of creation. For him, all purposes were self-loving and selfish. From the perspective of Unification Thought, however, human beings have a dual purpose, namely, the purpose for the whole and the purpose for the individual, and originally they were to pursue the purpose for the individual while placing priority on the purpose for the whole. In contrast, what Kant referred to as "purpose" was nothing but the purpose for the individual. As a result, he denigrated every kind of purpose, and his moral law came to be a law without a standard.<sup>38</sup>

Nonetheless, if the ideal world is restored on earth, I believe we can find the conflict of teleological ethics and deontological ethics basically disappear. In the Divine Principle book, we can find an element of deontological ethics as well. In its section on the original mind, it indicates that if we follow the desire of the original mind, our actions will automatically turn out to be good. The Divine Principle book presents the conscience and original mind as follows:

The <u>conscience</u> is that faculty of the human mind which, by virtue of its inborn nature, always directs us toward what we think is good. However, due to the Fall, human beings have become ignorant of God and thus ignorant of the absolute standard of goodness. For this reason, we are unable to set the proper standard of judgment for our conscience. As the standard of goodness varies, the standard of our conscience also fluctuates; this causes frequent contention even among those who advocate a conscientious life.

The <u>original mind</u> is that faculty of the human mind which pursues absolute goodness. It relates to the conscience as internal nature to external form. A person's conscience directs him to pursue goodness according to the standard which he has set up in ignorance, even though it may differ from the original standard. However, the original mind, being sensitive to the proper direction, repels this faulty standard and works to correct the conscience.<sup>39</sup>

In the ideal world where everyone understands God's Will, there will be no conflict between obeying one's duty and pursuing one's purpose of life. The original mind is supposed to understand both one's duty and God's purpose of creation. In other words, we may well say that, in the original world, to obey the Heavenly Law by following the command of our original mind will lead us to the fulfillment of God's purpose of creation.

#### 3. Consequential Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

Consequential ethics is an ethical theory that says the real or projected consequences of one's act are the most important to consider when making a moral judgment.<sup>40</sup> Very similar to teleological ethics, consequential ethics is an antithesis of deontological ethics. Therefore, some scholars do not make a clear distinction between teleological ethics and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> HSA-UWC, Exposition of the Divine Principle, pp. 50-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> For the discussion of consequential ethics, see e.g., Burtness, <u>Consequences</u>, pp. 98-141. As a Christian ethicist, he strongly argued for consequential ethics.

consequential ethics.<sup>41</sup> We may regard consequential ethics as a kind of teleological ethics. Consequential ethics is also somewhat similar to situation ethics in the sense that both deny the existence of the universal moral rules to obey. Consequential ethics will consider any act good if it results in good consequences. Consequential ethics is often applied to the analysis of the past act to judge whether it was good or bad. An act will be judged good, if the projected and anticipated consequence of the act is good or if its consequence turns out to be good. Therefore, consequential ethics demands us to undertake an act that maximizes good consequences. If we take up the case of telling a lie, consequential ethicits' appraisal of the act of telling a lie totally depends on its result or on its anticipated result. Therefore, they do not reject the act of telling a lie as categorically wrong from the very beginning; if the act of telling a lie results, or is anticipated to result, in good consequences, they judge even that kind of act to be good.

A good example of consequential ethics is Bentham's utilitarianism. As Unification Thought book summarized his ethical view, "Bentham calculated pleasure and pain quantitatively, regarding as good any act that brought the greatest pleasure, thus advocating 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number' as the principle of his moral philosophy."<sup>42</sup> As I mentioned in the critique of Kant's deontological ethics, Unification Thought book's theory of ethics points out that "[i]n deciding whether or not a certain act is good, one must ascertain the result of that act."<sup>43</sup> Therefore, we can also say that Unification Thought's theory of ethics basically supports consequential ethics as a methodology.<sup>44</sup>

Nonetheless, just like teleological ethics, the problem of consequential ethics is that there is no agreement among scholars in defining the good consequences. Therefore, consequential ethics has often ended up in pursuing partially good consequences. For example, although Bentham discerned four distinguishable sources to bring pleasure or pain to people, namely, the physical, the political, the moral, and the religious,<sup>45</sup> "he regarded physical source as the most fundamental one, for only physical pleasure and pain can be calculated objectively."<sup>46</sup> Therefore, he was most concerned about improving the physical or material living conditions of as many people as possible. The problem of Bentham's utilitarian ethics is that "Bentham understood happiness as centered on material pleasure." According to Unification Thought, however, "true happiness for humans cannot be obtained through material pleasure alone."<sup>47</sup>

We can also classify William James's pragmatic ethics as a kind of consequential ethics.<sup>48</sup> James regarded "what works," or what is useful as valuable and good. In other words, James attached importance to the consequence of

<sup>46</sup> UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 215.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 216.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> For example, W. K. Frankena did not make separate sections for teleological ethics and consequential ethics, respectively. See Frankena, <u>Ethics</u>. Burtness also noted that "In regards to ethics, consequentialism is a teleological method" and that "Consequentialism is sometimes used as a synonym for teleology." See Burtness, <u>Consequences</u>, p. 98. Nonetheless, he made a distinction between the two and extensively discussed consesequentialism in his work <u>Consequences</u>. I followed Burtness's wisdom in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, p. 215.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> This is not a contradiction with my previous statement that Unification Thought basically supports teleological ethics, because consequential ethics uses a teleological method.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See Jeremy Bentham, <u>The Principle of Morals and Legislation</u> (New York: Prometheus, 1988), p. 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> For example, Robin Gill stated that "Various types of ethical utilitarianism and pragmatism constitute forms of consequential argument." See Robin Gill, <u>A Textbook of Christian Ethics</u>, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), p. 7.

The purpose of creation is to actualize true love (God's love). Therefore, an act in accord with the purpose of creation is good. An act that is useful to life is not necessarily good. Of course, if an act that is useful to life is also in accordance with the purpose of creation, it becomes good. James based truth and goodness on usefulness for life; instead, however, he should have looked for the purpose for which life exists and the purpose for which people live.<sup>49</sup>

In other words, just like Bentham's utilitarianism, James's pragmatism was not fully aware of what really constitutes the good consequence, because he did not understand God's purpose of creation.

It seems that currently, consequential ethics has a fairy large number of supporters among academic ethicists. Daniel M. Nelson, who is a Roman Catholic ethicist of virtue, noted in 1992 that a version of natural law and consequentialism "have recently been the main choices" among Roman Catholic ethicists.<sup>50</sup> Arguing for consequentialism, Lutheran ethicist James H. Burtness also made it clear in his work <u>Consequences</u> that he supports consequential ethics.<sup>51</sup>

#### 4. Situation Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

Situation ethics is an ethical theory that asserts the importance of the particularity of each situation in which the action takes place. Situation ethics denies the existence of universal moral obligations or rules that are applicable to all situations. According to situation ethics, whether a particular act is good or bad totally depends on each situation. There is no universal moral rule that applies to all actions when making a moral judgment.<sup>52</sup> Situation ethics emphasizes that each action is different in its context and that there is no exactly same action even if the actor is the same person. Therefore, situation ethics insists on making a moral judgment case by case. If we take up the case of telling a lie, situation ethics does not reject the act of telling a lie categorically wrong or bad. Situation ethics asserts that the act of telling a lie categorically wrong or bad.

Christian ethicist Joseph Fletcher made the term "situation ethics" famous by his book of that title published in 1966.<sup>53</sup> Very critical of deontological ethics or legalism, situation ethics is somewhat similar to teleological ethics and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> UTI, Essentials of Unification Thought, p. 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Daniel Mark Nelson, <u>The Priority of Prudence: Virtue and Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas and the Implications for Modern</u> <u>Ethics</u> (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), p. 134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See Burtness, <u>Consequences</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Joseph Fletcher, however, noted that, unlike secular situationism,

Christian situation ethics has only one norm or principle or law (call it what you will) that is binding and unexceptionable, always good and right regardless of the circumstances. That is "love"—the agape of the summary commandment to love God and the neighbor. Everything else without exception, all laws and rules and principles and ideas and norms, are only contingent, only valid if they happen to serve love in any situation.

See Fletcher, Situation Ethics, p. 30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u>. For discussions on situation ethics, see Harvey Cox, ed., <u>The Situation Ethics Debate</u> (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1968).

consequential ethics in that it agrees in the statement that "the end justifies the means."<sup>54</sup> Not only Fletcher but also many other scholars in our contemporary time have supported situation ethics. Because existentialist philosophy tends to encourage us to make a courageous subjective decision in each situation, Burtness says that "all philosophical existentialists are ethical situationists."<sup>55</sup> For him, "Existentialist ethics," therefore, is a term closely related to situation ethics."<sup>56</sup> Some scholars have used the term "contextualism," "occasionalism," or "circumstantialism" in presenting essentially situation ethics.<sup>57</sup> Other scholars including Fletcher himself have used the term "act-utilitarianism" with love substituted for happiness as the criterion for utility when explaining situation ethics.<sup>58</sup>

Unification Thought textbook does not have a section to appraise situation ethics.<sup>59</sup> It never mentions situation ethics. Therefore, it is not clear how Unification Thought's theory of ethics will appraise situation ethics. Nonetheless, we can attempt to discuss a Unificationist appraisal of situation ethics on the basis of the Divine Principle book and Rev. Moon's speeches in addition to Unification Thought textbook. If we begin with a similarity between situation ethics and Unification Thought's theory of ethics, both reject the existence of the universal moral obligations or rules we must keep in all circumstances in the past human history. Therefore, Moses' killing of an Egyptian taskmaster and Jesus' mother Mary's having a premarital sexual relation with Zechariah are considered good and justifiable.<sup>60</sup> In my view, it is possible that we make an accurate moral judgment of these acts on the basis of the case-by-case approach like situation ethics. Nonetheless, Unification Thought finds universal laws of human history and makes a moral judgment of these acts on the basis of God's providential purpose, which was to fulfill God's purpose of creation by laying the foundation to receive the Messiah. The Divine Principle book presents the distinction between God's side and Satan's side and justifies what seems to be an unethical act by God's side on the basis of its being in line with God's providence. For example, the Divine Principle book states as follows:

The question of which nations are on God's side and which are on Satan's side is decided based on the direction of God's providence of restoration. Those who are in line with the direction of God's providence or are acting in concert with that direction, even indirectly, are on the side of God, while those who take an opposing position are on the side of Satan. Therefore, whether or not an individual or nation belongs to God's side or Satan's side is not always in agreement with the judgment of our common sense or conscience. For example, someone who is ignorant of God's providence may judge that Moses' killing of the Egyptian taskmaster was evil. Yet, it may be regarded as a good act because it was in line with God's providence. Likewise, the Israelites

<sup>60</sup> For Rev. Sun Myung Moon's speech about Mary's relations with Zechariah, see e.g., Sun Myung Moon, "View of the Principle of the Providential History of Salvation," in <u>True Family and World Peace: Speeches by the Reverend and Mrs. Sun Myung Moon in the Completed Testament Age</u> (New York: HSA Publications, 2000), pp. 53-54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u>, p. 120.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Burtness, Consequences, p. 74.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> For contextualism, see e.g., Paul Lehmann, <u>Ethics in a Christian Context</u> (London: SCM, 1963). Fletcher also mentioned these three terms as an equivalent of situation ethics. See Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u>, p. 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> See e.g., Jean Porter, <u>Moral Action and Christian Ethics</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> Unification Thought textbook has a section for appraisal of traditional ethical theories of Kant, Bentham, analytic philosophy, and pragmatism. See UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, pp. 212-221.

invaded the land of Canaan and killed many Canaanites seemingly without much justification. To someone ignorant of God's providence, their action might seem evil and cruel; nevertheless, it was just in the sight of God.<sup>61</sup>

Thus, Unification Thought acknowledges the central importance of God's providence in deciding good and evil. Therefore, Unification Thought, at least in its interpretation of history quoted above, seems to be more in line with teleological ethics. Nonetheless, the outcome of the judgment of an act by either teleological or situational methodology appears to arrive at the same moral conclusion. I must add, however, that the past and current conflict between situation ethics and deontological ethics, just like the conflict between teleological ethics and deontological ethics in the past, will disappear in the future when the original world is restored or when every one acts centering on the original mind.

#### 5. Character Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

Character ethics is an ethical theory that says forming a good character or virtue is the most important to consider when making a moral judgment. Character ethics is also called virtue ethics. Character ethics considers the emphasis on decisions and actions, maintained by all other traditional ethical theories (e.g., deontological ethics, situation ethics, consequential ethics, and teleological ethics), to be misplaced. They believe that ethics should focus not on the act, but on the character of a person who acts. Character ethics by Protestant ethicists is also critical of the emphasis on the reason and intellect promoted by the Enlightenment thought and would rather attach importance to the heart and emotion. If we take up the case of telling a lie, character ethicists will refuse to focus on the act itself and emphasize the importance of forming a person of character; according to them, to produce good persons with good character is the most important to consider. Christian ethicists of character often quote the Biblical passage: "every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit" (Matt. 7: 17). Therefore, the recent rise of character ethics is a major shift in the focus of the discipline of ethics.

According to Burtness, character ethics or virtue ethics "goes back as far as Aristotle, but as recently as the 1970s it was not formally included as a specific ethical position in many ethics texts."<sup>62</sup> Nonetheless, Burtness noted in 1999 that "[a]t the present time, character ethics is a major option that nobody interested in the discipline of ethics can ignore."<sup>63</sup> It is also noteworthy that the rise of academic interest in character ethics since the 1980s is described as "a quiet revolution" that "has been gathering momentum in the fields of moral philosophy and Christian ethics."<sup>64</sup> It seems that philosophical ethicists and the Roman Catholic ethicists prefer the term "virtue ethics," whereas Protestant ethicists have a tendency to use the term "character ethics." Many philosophical ethicists and Roman Catholic ethicists have usually been under the strong influence of Aristotle and/or Aquinas, both of whom stated the importance of acquiring and nurturing virtues. Aristotle spoke of four primary virtues: prudence, justice, courage, and temperance. In addition to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> HSA-UWC, Exposition of the Divine Principle, p. 368.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Burtness, <u>Consequences</u>, p. 83.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> Romanus Cessario, <u>The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), the back of the book cover.

these philosophical virtues, Aquinas added the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love.65

As I mentioned above, Aristotle's ethics is usually classified as a teleological ethics, because it posited happiness (<u>eudaimonia</u>) as the ultimate goal toward which the human being is directed. Nonetheless, Aristotle's ethics also had a strand of character (or virtue) ethics. Aristotle defined happiness (<u>eudaimonia</u>) "as an activity of soul in accordance with virtue."<sup>66</sup> According to him, one of the essential elements of human happiness is the virtuous life, and we become virtuous persons by practicing the virtues. For him, virtue is "a state of character," and that "an intermediate state" between two extremes. Consequently, he asserted that it is very important for us to develop our character by acquiring a habit of practicing the moral virtues.<sup>67</sup>

Some of the influential character ethicists in our contemporary time are Gilbert Meilaender, Stanley Hauerwas, and James McClendon.<sup>68</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre's work <u>After Virtue</u>, which was published in 1981, also contributed to the rise of interest in virtue ethics, because it advocated restoring our interest in Aristotelian virtues and criticized the rationalistic and nihilistic analyses in ethics such as the emotive theory of ethics developed under the strong influence of the Enlightenment mentality.<sup>69</sup>

Some of the character ethicists are also known as narrative ethicists.<sup>70</sup> We can view narrative ethics as part of character ethics. Since the 1970s, narrative ethics has emerged as a critique of traditional rationalistic ethics that emphasized right decisions as well as rationality, which was championed by the Enlightenment thought. Narrative ethicists have emphasized the importance of forming a character of a person and discerned the strong influence of

<sup>68</sup> See e.g., Gilbert Meilaender, <u>The Theory and Practice of Virtue</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), <u>Friendship:</u> <u>A Study in Theological Ethics</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981); Stanley Hauerwas, <u>Character and the Christian Life</u> (San Antonio: Trinity University Press, 1975), <u>A Community of Character</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), <u>The Hauerwas Reader</u>, edited by John Berkman and Michael Cartwright (Durham: Duke University Press); Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches, <u>Christians among the Virtues: Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997); James McClendon, <u>Biography as Theology</u> (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1974), <u>Ethics: Systematic Theology</u>, Vol. 1 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Aquinas's ethical view has often been classified as a type of deontological ethics because of his emphasis on the natural law. Nonetheless, some ethicists of virtue have recently argued that his ethical theory has a strand of virtue ethics and that he should be classified as an ethicist of virtue rather than an ethicist of the natural law. See e.g., Nelson, <u>Priority of Prudence</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> David Ross, An Introduction to <u>The Nicomachean Ethics</u> by Aristotle, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. vii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> For Aristotle's ethics, see ibid., pp. v-xxviii; Aristotle, <u>The Nicomachean E</u>thics, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> See Alasdair MacIntyre, <u>After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory</u> (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Other notable literature that belongs to the genre of character (virtue) ethics is Cessario, <u>Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics</u>; Rosalind Hursthouse, <u>On Virtue Ethics</u> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Nelson, <u>Priority of Prudence</u>; Jean Porter, <u>The Recovery of</u> <u>Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics</u> (Louiville: Westminister John Knox, 1990); Lewis B. Smedes, <u>A Pretty Good</u> <u>Person</u> (San Francisco: Harper, 1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Hauerwas and McClendon are probably better known as narrative ethicists/theologians rather than as character ethicists among the readers of their work. McClendon was one of my M.A. thesis advisors at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, and I am very sympathetic with the methodology of narrative ethics.

narratives or stories in forming the human character. Narrative ethicists are not convinced that the rationalistic and intellectual analyses of ethics and morality will produce a person who can practice warm love and do the right things. They consider it more essential and important to form a person of good character and believe that the human character is best formed and nurtured by the touching stories that move our heart rather than our head.

Narrative ethicists also emphasize that not only an individual but also a community is formed and nurtured by such moving stories. According to Hauerwas, who has played the most influential role in popularizing the narrative ethics, the Gospel stories and Biblical stories form and nurture the Christian character of the individual Christians and of the local Christian community, and these stories also strengthen the bond between each Christian and his or her Christian community. For him, forming the Christian community of character through emotionally moving stories, rather than the intellectual education in rationalistic ethics, is the best way to produce a person who practice Christian love and do the right thing.<sup>71</sup>

The theory of ethics in the textbook of Unification Thought does not have a section to appraise character ethics. Neither does it have a section on narrative ethics. Therefore, it is not clear how the Unification Thought's theory of ethics responds to character ethics. Nonetheless, it is my conviction that character ethics is very congenial to Unification Thought's theory of ethics. In comparison to other systems of thought such as Marxism and Scholasticism, Unification Thought's emphasizes the importance of heart and emotion rather than intellect. We can see an evidence of Unification Thought's emphasis on the importance of character and heart in its theory of education.<sup>72</sup> As an ideal education, it presents the three forms of education: "education of heart," "education of norm," and "education of dominion (intellectual education, technical education, and physical education)." According to Unification Thought's theory of education of heart comes first, and the goal of education of heart is described as a "person of character." As the image of the ideal educated person, a "person of character" is presented as follows.

The image of the ideal person in the Education of Heart is that of a "person of character." Education of Heart is the education that leads to the experience of God's Heart. Those who receive this type of education become persons of character. Heart is the source of love, and it is the core of personality. Those who are lacking in Heart – regardless of how much knowledge they may have, or how healthy they may be, or how much power they may hold – will never be persons of character. In the secular concept, a person with a certain degree of virtue, knowledge, and health may be called a person of character, but in Unification Thought, a person of character is one who has internalized God's Heart and who practice love.<sup>73</sup>

Furthermore, Unification Thought's theory of education presents the three kinds of God's Heart: "the Heart of hope, the Heart of sorrow, and the Heart of pain," and describes the contents of the three kinds of God's Heart by presenting God's stories. Moreover, Unification Thought textbook states that "[t]hrough education of Heart, children should come to understand the three kinds of God's Heart described above, especially the Heart of God in the course of the providence of restoration (the Heart of pain)" and presents, through summarized stories, "God's Heart in the course of Adam's family,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> See e.g., Hauerwas, <u>Community of Character</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> For the theory of education in the textbook of Unification Thought, see e.g., UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification Thought</u>, pp. 167-201.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., pp. 187-188.

Noah's family, and Abraham's family and also in Moses' course and Jesus' course."<sup>74</sup> Thus, we can see Unification Thought congenial with character ethics and narrative ethics. To be more precise, we can say that character ethics (narrative ethics) is critical of the traditional intellectual education of ethics and advocates the education of character by way of the moving narratives; therefore character ethics (narrative ethics) is very congenial with Unification Thought's "education of heart" that aims at forming a "person of character."

My critique of character ethics is that the even though character ethicists agree with the importance of forming a person of good character, they are not unanimous in defining what constitutes the good character. Hauerwas was often criticized of his so-called "sectarian" tendency in his narrative ethics, because he was not concerned with forming ideal persons of character for a whole society, much less for a global society.<sup>75</sup> The implication of Hauerwas's view is as follows; Christians should be concerned about forming persons and community of genuine Christian character on the basis of the Biblical stories centering on Jesus, the Jewish believers should be concerned about forming persons and community of genuine Jewish character on the basis of the stories in the Hebrew scriptures centering on Moses, and the Moslem believers should be concerned about forming persons and community of genuine Islamic character on the basis of stories in Koran. Therefore, unless we can find common stories that create a unified global community of character, the world will become a large number of various communities of different characters. In other words, Hauerwas's character ethics (narrative ethics) has a danger of ushering in ethical pluralism. Hauerwas discourages us from transforming the whole society and advocates to maintain an elitist community of the remnant Christians who withdraw from the world. Consequently, he was criticized of his discouragement of our involvement in the democratic process of moral discussions with those who have different moral values.<sup>76</sup> In contrast to Protestant narrative ethicists, philosophical and Roman Catholic ethicists of virtue tend to seek after universally good human character and virtues on the basis of Aristotelian and Thomistic concepts of the general virtues and virtuous life. Nonetheless, I still find Unification Thought's explanation of the "person of character" much more satisfactory than their presentation of the person of character or virtues.77

#### 6. Antinomian Ethics from a Perspective of Unification Thought

Antinomian ethics is an ethical theory that denies the existence of the universal standard of good and evil that is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Ibid., pp. 176-181.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> See e.g., Burtness, <u>Consequences</u>, p. 88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> For an incisive critique of Hauerwas and MacIntyre's ethical views, see Jeffrey Stout, <u>Ethics After Babel: The Languages of</u> <u>Morals and Their Discontents</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); especially informative is its author's new postscript in the book.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> This is largely because Unification Thought's explanation of the "person of character" is much more heartisite than philosophical and Roman Catholic ethicists' explanation of the "person of character or virtues," which is more rational. I cannot fully explain here why in my view the person of character should be more heartisite than rational. Suffice it to say that I agree with the narrative ethicists' critique of the enlightenment rationality and intellectualism.

applicable to each and every person.<sup>78</sup> Because there are a number of ethical theories that deny the existence of the universal standard of good and evil, it might be more accurate to say in plural that antinomian ethics consist of a group of ethical theories that deny the existence of the universal standard of good and evil. Some of the ethical theories that belong to the category of antinomian ethics are emotivism, cultural relativism, and subjectivism.<sup>79</sup>

"Cultural relativism" is an ethical theory that says the standard of good and evil is relative to culture. What is "good" is what is "socially approved" in a given culture, and our moral standard is based on the norms of our culture.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, cultural relativism denies the existence of the universal standard of good and evil. Anthropologists tend to support cultural relativism. On the other hand, "subjectivism" is an ethical theory that says our moral judgments describe how we feel. To call something "good" means "I like that." Our moral judgment of an act depends on our feelings toward it. Therefore, subjectivism is very individualistic and denies the existence of the universal standard of good and evil. We can regard the emotive theory of ethics as a typical case of subjectivism.

Probably the most influential antinomian ethics is the "emotive theory of ethics" represented by M. Schlick and A. J. Ayer. M. Schlick and A. J. Ayer were renowned scholars of analytic philosophy who focused on the logical analysis of language, that is, logical positivism. Ayer was an Oxford University professor and outspoken supporter of logical positivism. Ayer defined the emotive theory of ethics as the doctrine "that moral judgments are emotive rather than descriptive, that they are persuasive expressions of attitudes and not statements of fact, and consequently that they cannot be either true or false, or at least that it would make for clarity if the categories of truth and falsehood were not applied to them."<sup>81</sup> In other words, he asserted that "goodness is no more than a word expressing a subjective feeling and a quasi-idea that cannot be verified objectively."<sup>82</sup> If we take up the case of telling a lie, supporters of the emotive theory of ethics will say that an ethical proposition such as, "It is wrong to tell a lie," is "nothing but the speaker's expression of a feeling of moral disapproval and cannot be regarded as either true or false."<sup>83</sup>

Unification Thought is very critical of scholars of analytical philosophy who regard goodness as something undefinable and a quasi-idea that cannot be verified objectively. The textbook of Unification Thought criticizes such an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> I followed Geisler's and Fletcher's classifying category of the "antinomianism" in my selection of the "antinomian ethics" as one of the ethical theories that represent the discipline of ethics. Fletcher classified ethical theories into the three categories: legalism, situationism, and antinomianism. See Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u>, pp. 17-39. For Geisler's classifying categories of ethical theories, see Geisler, <u>Christian Ethics</u> and above. Practitioners of what I call an "antinomian ethics," however, never identified themselves as such as far as I know. Some scholars referred to antinomianism in ethics as "amoralism" and its supporter as "the amoralist." See e.g., Bernard Williams, <u>Morality: An Introduction to Ethics</u> (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972); Richard Garner, <u>Beyond Morality</u> (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> For the explanation of cultural relativism, subjectivism, and emotivism, see e.g., Harry J. Gensler, <u>Ethics: A Contemporary</u> <u>Introduction</u> (London: Routledge, 1998).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Very few philosophical ethicists have supported cultural relativism partly because it ends in affirming racism such as anti-Semitism and discrimination by the white against the colored minority races. For a discussion on cultural relativism, see e.g., John W. Cook, <u>Morality and Cultural Differences</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> A. J. Ayer, "On the Analysis of Moral Judgment," <u>Horizon</u> 20 (1949); reprinted in his <u>Philosophical Essays</u> (London: Macmillan, 1954), p. 246; as quoted in Sahakian, <u>Ethics</u>, p. 212.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> UTI, Essentials of Unification Thought, p. 217.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

From the Unification Thought's perspective, however, goodness can be clearly defined. In a nutshell, humans have the clear purpose of realizing God's love through the family four-position base; thus a behavior in agreement with this purpose is good.<sup>84</sup>

Unification Thought's theory of ethics is undoubtedly most critical of antinomian ethics among these six ethical theories discussed in this paper. As we can see in the case of the emotive theory of ethics, antinomian ethics usually belong to the realm of philosophical ethics. It is noteworthy, however, that antinomian ethics has recently been under attack even by other fellow philosophical ethicists and seems to be in decline in recent years as we can see in the recent rise of interest in virtue ethics since the 1980s among philosophical ethicists or moral philosophers.<sup>85</sup>

## IV. Conclusion: The Relevance of Unification Thought to the Discipline of Ethics

In the first section of this paper, we attempted to re-systematize Unification Thought's theory of ethics by discerning and revising the limitation of the existing Unification Thought book's theory of ethics. In the second section, we presented classifications of the discipline of ethics by the nature of its contents, by its methodology to determine the good and the right, by its subject field, and by the type of its researchers. In the third section, from a perspective of Unification Thought, we presented and appraised six major ethical theories that represent the discipline of ethics. In this Conclusion, we will appraise the relevance of Unification Thought to the discipline of ethics.

The discipline of ethics is still chaotic and has many points of disagreement especially in the issue of the proper methodology to determine the good and the right. Nonetheless, I am convinced that Unification Thought has excellent resources to guide and untangle the difficult issues in the discipline of ethics. As I discussed in the Section III above, Unification Thought can basically support teleological ethics, consequential ethics, and character ethics, but in my view it improves and clarifies each of these theories. It improves teleological ethics by clarifying our ultimate goal or purpose as the fulfillment of God's purpose of creation, that is, the completion of the Three Great Blessings and building of the Heavenly Kingdom on earth and in heaven centering on the ideal families. It also improves consequential ethics by clarifying the good consequences; the ultimate good consequence is none other than the fulfillment of God's purpose of creation, the completion of the Three Great Blessings, and building of the Heavenly Kingdom on earth and in heaven centering on the ideal families. After all, consequential ethics is a kind of teleological ethics.

Frankly speaking, I am very inspired by the recent rise of academic interest in character ethics among moral philosophers and Christian ethicists. Unification Thought also improves character ethics by clarifying the image of a "person of character," which is elaborated in detail in Unification Thought's theory of education. Unification Thought also improves narrative ethics by presenting numerous God-centered stories that really move our heart into tears. Unification Thought's God is not a sectarian God of a small exclusive community, but the Creator God the Father-Mother of all human beings throughout the global world. Therefore, it can avoid the "sectarian" tendency of the Hauerwasian narrative ethics and contribute to the creation of a global human community that transcends the differences of religions, nationalities, and races. In the light of Unification Thought, we can also see that character ethics or virtue ethics as a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> For example, see MacIntyre, <u>After Virtue</u>.

type of teleological ethics that considers forming of a person of character to be the most important goal. Because forming of a person of character or virtue is basically none other than the completion of the First Blessing (perfection of the individual), Unification Thought can also agree with the basic viewpoint of such character ethics.

It is noteworthy that Hauerwas has recently come to recognize the importance of understanding "telos" (goal) in the Christian moral life.<sup>86</sup> According to him, "the moral life, and in particular the Christian moral life, requires a teleological conception of human existence that gets somewhere rather than forever being a movement between the 'back and forth."<sup>87</sup> He acknowledged his own shortcomings of his early work as follows:

The absence of this fuller account of the teleological character of the Christian life accounts for the rather curious Kantian flavor that is still present in <u>Character and the Christian Life</u>. For there is a sense that my account of character at times appears like that of Kant—namely, the attempt to secure a unity to our lives not because we know where we are going but because we do not.<sup>88</sup>

Therefore, Hauerwas now says "why it is so important not to divorce the discussion of character from questions of happiness and friendship."<sup>89</sup> Thus, recognizing the importance of the "telos" in the Christian moral life, he appears to be moving in the direction of a synthesis between character ethics and teleological ethics.

As for shortcomings of the Protestant narrative ethics or character ethics, although it aims at creation of the local Christian church community of character, it is lacking in the moving stories that form an ideal <u>family</u> of character because the New Testament Bible does not have any touching story that really unites a husband and a wife. Jesus never married and did not encourage his disciples to live a married life. Aristotle and Aquinas's ethics of virtue also presented the virtue of an individual person in a society and the virtue of friendship between individuals, but it is lacking in the concept of the virtue of a family person and of the virtue between members of a family such as between a husband and a wife, between parents and children, and between brothers and sisters. Although Aristotle and Aquinas's ethics of virtue is concerned with the virtues in a society or with the common human virtues, as for the virtue of the human relationship, it emphasized only the importance of friendship between atomistic individuals. Therefore, in my view, narrative ethics and character ethics (virtue ethics) need to develop a new paradigm of forming an ideal character of family or of forming virtues of a family person as part of our important moral goal.

In contrast, Unification Thought presents not only the importance of forming an ideal individual character (perfection of the individual), but also the importance of forming an ideal family (perfection of a family); it presents forming an ideal family and practicing God's love in a family life as the completion of the "Second Blessing," as the most important part of God's purpose of creation, and as the most important part of the goodness in this universe. Thus, in contrast to the Western ethical views that are generally based on the concept of atomistic individuals, Unification Thought emphasizes that each individual is to occupy certain positions within a family (i.e., a position of a child, of a brother/sister, of a husband/wife, of a father/mother, and of a grandfather/grandmother) and to establish complimentary or interdependent relations with one another in a family. Unification Thought emphasizes that human beings are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> See Hauerwas, <u>Hauerwas Reader</u>, pp. 83-89.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., pp. 87n-88n.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 87.

interconnected and that we should have consciousness as a "connected body" or a combination of consciousness as a subjective partner and as an objective partner at the same time. Furthermore, unlike the Western ethical view of friendship that presents the relations between human beings of the equal standing, that is, horizontal orderly relations, Unification Thought's theory of ethics presents not only horizontal human relations but also vertical human relations such as between parents and children as the important part of ethical issues. Consequently, Unification Thought corrects the individualistic (atomistic), horizontal, and subjective tendency of the Western ethical views of human relations.

On the other hand, repulsing the idea that the end justifies the means, many Christian ethicists have supported deontological ethics. Therefore, they have been unable to make a proper moral judgment of acts by many Biblical central figures such as Jacob, the younger brother of Esau, Tamar, the daughter-in-law of Joseph, and Mary, the mother of Jesus, all of whom told a lie.<sup>90</sup> In contrast, Unification Though has solved the difficult problem of how to make a moral judgment of the central figures of providence in the Bible by supporting the method of teleological or consequential ethics and by clarifying what constitutes the ultimate goal or consequences.

In my view, Unification Thought is, however, not antagonistic to deontological ethics's prospect in the future. It is true that Unification Thought is critical of the method of deontological ethics when making a moral judgment of acts in the past in the so-called Fallen world. Nonetheless, it foresees the coming of the day when the original God-centered world is restored and when the individual person's following his or her own conviction (original mind) and the "Heavenly Law" will result in the realization of the public good. In other words, according to Unification Thought, the day will come when there will be no conflict between the deontological and teleological methods in reaching the right decision.

As I mentioned in the previous section, Unification Thought is very critical of antinomian ethics. As we can see in the work of MacIntyre and Hauerwas and in the rise of character (virtue) ethics, there have recently arisen critical scholarly voices against the strong influences of the Enlightenment mentality that produced the rationalistic and nihilistic analyses of ethics such as emotivism. I am convinced that Unification Thought can greatly contribute to the critique of antinomian ethics, which some scholars also call "amoralism." Fortunately, antinomian ethics has been somewhat or considerably in decline in recent years, and Unification Thought can facilitate the demise of antinomian ethics.

As for the situation ethics, it is the ethical theory in the Fallen world where there were severe conflicts and struggles. Almost all case studies Fletcher mentioned in his book <u>Situation Ethics</u> involved the situation of conflicts or war; some of these examples are whether a patriotic American woman should become a counterespionage agent to lure a communist spy in Europe into blackmail by using sex at the time of the Cold War, whether a German mother who is a POW in Russia at the end of World War II should intentionally commit an adultery with a prison guard so that she can become pregnant and be quickly liberated from the prison to be reunited with her husband and three small children at home in Germany, and whether President of the United States and its military leaders should decide to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima city in Japan during World War II.<sup>91</sup> Unification Thought has clarified that such situations of conflicting moral obligations came into existence in the past because the world had been in struggles between good and evil after the Fall of human ancestors. Nonetheless, according to Unification Thought, the world is destined to come to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> For the reason and moral justification of these Biblical figures' acts of deceit, see e.g., Sun Myung Moon, "View of the Principle of the Providential History of Salvation," in <u>True Family and World Peace</u>, pp. 50-54; Zin Moon Kim, <u>Fountain of Life: Based on the</u> <u>Words of Reverend Sun Myung Moon</u> (New York: HSA-UWC, 1993), p. 242.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> See Fletcher, <u>Situation Ethics</u>, pp. 163-168.

the end of the struggles between good and evil.<sup>92</sup> Therefore, situation ethics will be useless or irrelevant when a peaceful unified world is established.

Thus, Unification Thought can help us understand the shortcomings and relations of various ethical theories; it can also guide us towards the future convergence of the teleological ethics, consequential ethics, character ethics, and deontological ethics in the discipline of the ethics.<sup>93</sup> I hope this paper has been of help in clarifying the relevance of Unification Thought to the discipline of ethics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> The Unification view of history presents the human history as having been in a process of struggles between good and evil and also in a process of restoration to the original sinless world. For the Unification view of history, see UTI, <u>Essentials of Unification</u> <u>Thought</u>, pp. 259-298.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> In recent years, a number of scholars have attempted to synthesize ethical theories. See e.g., David Cummiskey, <u>Kantian</u> <u>Consequentialism</u> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

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